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On Inferring Browsing Activity on Smartphones via
USB Power Analysis Side-Channel
Qing Yang, Paolo Gasti, Member, IEEE, Gang Zhou, Senior Member, IEEE,
Aydin Farajidavar, and Kiran S. Balagani
Abstract— In this paper, we show that public USB charging
stations pose a significant privacy risk to smartphone users even
when no data communication is possible between the station
and the user’s mobile device. We present a side-channel attack
that allows a charging station to identify which Webpages are
loaded while the smartphone is charging. To evaluate this side-
channel, we collected power traces of Alexa top 50 Websites
on multiple smartphones under several conditions, including
battery charging level, browser cache enabled/disabled, taps on
the screen, Wi-Fi/LTE, TLS encryption enabled/disabled, time
elapsed between collection of training and testing data, and
location of the Website. The results of our evaluation show that
the attack is highly successful: in many settings, we were able
to achieve over 90% Webpage identification accuracy. On the
other hand, our experiments also show that this side-channel is
sensitive to some of the aforementioned conditions. For instance,
when training and testing traces were collected 70 days apart,
accuracies were as low as 2.2%. Although there are studies
that show that power-based side-channels can predict browsing
activity on laptops, this paper is unique, because it is the first
to study this side-channel on smartphones, under smartphone-
specific constraints. Further, we demonstrate that Websites can
be correctly identified within a short time span of 2 × 6 seconds,
which is in contrast with prior work, which uses 15-s traces. This
is important, because users typically spend less than 15 s on a
Webpage.
Index Terms— Side-channel attacks, privacy, activity
recognition, smartphone security.
I. INTRODUCTION
USERS commonly rely on their smartphones for a varietyof energy-intensive activities such as video streaming,
web browsing, connection sharing (hotspot), gaming, and
VoIP. As a consequence, recharging smartphones multiple
times a day has become common practice. A recent survey [1]
found that users in the United States charge their smartphones
anywhere from 1.8 to 2.6 times a day on average.
To address users’ charging needs, USB charging stations (or
kiosks) are becoming ubiquitous in many public areas, includ-
ing airports [2], parks [3], [4], hotels [5], and hospitals [6].
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While charging stations undoubtedly provide convenience
to smartphone users, they also expose them to privacy threats.
For example, in an attack called “juice-jacking”, an untrusted
charging station exfiltrates data by covertly setting the smart-
phone into USB transfer mode [7]. To counter data exfiltration
attacks, hardware devices such as SyncStop [8] are designed
to physically interrupt data wires at the USB port, thereby
blocking all data transfers. In this paper, we show that even
physically interrupting USB data wires does not prevent a
charging station from extracting sensitive information from
the smartphone. In particular, we demonstrate that a malicious
charging station can infer smartphone browsing activity by
analyzing USB power consumption patterns. In our experi-
ments, we were able to identify with high accuracy which
webpage the user was visiting, by applying standard machine
learning techniques to power traces.
We believe that our attack represents a serious threat to
privacy, because: (1) USB charging stations are becoming
widespread around the world, and therefore more and more
users can be targeted by this attack; and (2) the modifications
required to implement the attack can be easily concealed
(e.g., see [9]), and can therefore go unnoticed by users.
A. Contributions and Findings
To fully characterize the side-channel associated with USB
power consumption, we analyzed how webpage identifica-
tion accuracy is impacted by variables pertinent to mobile
devices, such as battery charging level, wireless connection
(WiFi or LTE), and taps on the screen. To our knowledge, this
is the first work that tests the feasibility of this attack against
constraints commonly encountered in a mobile environment.
In addition, we determined the impact of other variables that
have not been considered in prior studies on power-based side-
channels [10]. These include availability of browser cache,
training and testing signals collected on different smartphones,
the time elapsed between the collection of training and testing
signals, geographical proximity between the user and the
web server, duration of power traces, and availability of
encrypted (TLS) connections on identification accuracy. Next,
we summarize our findings.
a) Impact of Battery Charge Level and Taps on
Screen: Both charging the battery and tapping on the screen
reduced webpage identification accuracy. Identification accu-
racy decreased when the smartphone’s battery was charging at
30% level, compared to when the battery was fully charged.
However, even with the decrease in accuracy, it was still
1556-6013 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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possible to reliably infer browsing information. Similarly, taps
on the screen added significant noise to the power traces, mak-
ing webpage identification challenging. Our results show that
this factor caused a significant degradation in identification
performance.
b) Impact of Other Variables: The time elapsed between
collection of training and testing traces had a major impact
on webpage identification accuracy, with training traces older
than 30 days leading to a significant drop in identification
accuracy. This suggests that traces used to train the classifiers
should be updated frequently to improve the attack’s success
rate.
Increasing the duration of power traces for training and
testing led to improved identification accuracy.
We were able to reliably identify webpages under both WiFi
and LTE, even when the training power traces were collected
using one type of connectivity (e.g., LTE), and the testing
traces were obtained with another (e.g., WiFi).
When using different smartphones for training and testing,
accuracies dropped significantly. However, using two smart-
phones for training, and a different smartphone for testing
reduced the drop in webpage identification accuracies.
When the user did not tap on the screen, enabling browser
cache improved identification accuracy. However, for power
traces collected when the user tapped on the screen and while
the smartphone was charging, enabling cache led to a decrease
in webpage identification accuracies.
Our results show that increasing the geographical distance
between the smartphone and the host serving the webpages
reduced identification accuracy. When we divided webpages in
foreign (located outside of the continental United States), and
local (within the United States), we observed that webpages
hosted locally had slightly higher identification accuracies than
foreign-hosted webpages.
Finally, retrieving webpages via secure connections (HTTPS
or, more specifically, TLS) did not have a measurable impact
on identification accuracy.
c) Experiment Results: In our experiments, we used
machine learning algorithms to identify which webpage the
user visited out of a closed set of fifty webpages [11].
We were able to achieve identification accuracies as high as
98.8% with 2-second traces. Even in the worst case, i.e., when
the cache was enabled, the user tapped on the screen, and the
battery was charging from 30%, we achieved an identification
accuracy of 54.2% with 6-second traces. When training and
testing traces were collected using different smartphones,
identification accuracy was at least 44.5%. This is significantly
higher than choosing one out of fifty webpages at random
(which leads to 2% baseline accuracy).
B. Organization
We present the related work in Section II. Our setup and
data collection procedure is detailed in Section III. Section IV
describes our webpage identification technique. Evaluation
of our technique is presented in Section V. The impact
of (1) different devices for training and testing, (2) WiFi
and LTE, (3) training data aging, (4) website location, and
(5) connection type (HTTP/HTTPS) is analyzed in Section VI,
while the normalized accuracy of various ranks is discussed
in Section VII. We conclude in Section VIII. Details on the
dataset using in this paper are provided in Appendix.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review prior work on: (1) side-channel
attacks using power analysis; (2) webpage fingerprinting; and
(3) attacks on smartphones via USB port.
A. Side-Channel Attacks Using Power Analysis
Clark et al. [10] identified webpages loaded on a computer
by measuring power consumption at the AC wall outlet. Power
traces were analyzed in the frequency domain, and matched
using a SVM classifier. The evaluation results showed that this
side-channel attack achieved 86.75% precision and 74% recall.
The main differences between our work and [10] are as
follows. (1) Ours is the first to study this side-channel on
smartphones, which drastically differ in architecture from
desktops and laptops, and have hardware (e.g., a touch-
screen) not usually associated with traditional computers.
Additionally, smartphones adopt aggressive dynamic power
optimization techniques [12] that could interfere with the side-
channel. (2) In contrast with [10], our work explores how
the identification accuracy is affected by variables such as
battery charging level, user’s interaction with the touchscreen,
trace length, time between training of our identification model
and testing, type of wireless connection (WiFi and LTE),
and website characteristics (HTTP vs HTTPS, geographical
location). (3) The results reported in [10] were obtained
with 15-second traces, compared to 2- to 6-second traces in
our work. We consider this an important distinction, since
trace length has a large impact on identification accuracy,
and most users spend less than 15 seconds on average on a
webpage [13].
Several papers analyzed power data from sources other than
USB charging ports or AC outlets to extract cryptographic keys
or other private information. For instance, Genkin et al. [14]
demonstrated a side-channel attack based on electric potential
from computer chassis to extract RSA and ElGamal keys.
Their work is based on the observation that the fluctuation in
electric potential of the chassis correlates with computation.
Michalevsky et al. [15] introduced PowerSpy, a tool that
analyzes aggregate power consumption on the phone during
a period of several minutes to infer the user’s location. The
authors observed that the power consumption of a smartphone
is measurably affected by the smartphone’s distance from
the surrounding cellular base station. To obtain instantaneous
power consumption, PowerSpy uses unprivileged Android
APIs. For this reason, PowerSpy infers location information
without requesting any explicit permission to the user, in
contrast with the use of privileged location APIs—which
require explicit user confirmation.
Yan et al. [16] demonstrated that it is possible to iden-
tify running apps, details about on-screen content, password
lengths, and geographical locations by measuring instanta-
neous power consumption. Our work differs from [16] in
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the following ways. (1) Li et al. do not focus on website
identification. (2) They use a different adversary model, which
assumes that the adversary is able to install a malicious app
on the smartphone, or is able to measure power consumption
directly at the battery connectors inside the smartphone, rather
than at the USB port. Our attack uses USB charging port to
obtain power traces, and does not require the smartphone to
run malicious software. (3) Li et al. do not consider factors
common to smartphones, such as the current battery level or
the type of network used to retrieve data. These factors, as
demonstrated by our experiments, affect the accuracy of the
power-based side channel attack.
B. Webpage Fingerprinting via Traffic Analysis
Several side-channel attacks use network traffic analysis to
infer user’s web browsing activities. For example, Hintz [17]
demonstrated that transferred file sizes could be used as a
reliable fingerprint for webpages. Similarly, Lu et al. [18]
exploited both packet size and packet ordering information
to improve webpage identification success rate.
Additionally, studies have shown that encrypted chan-
nels do not protect against traffic analysis. For example,
Chen et al. [19] were able to infer browsing activity via packet
analysis on traffic encrypted using HTTPS and WPA.
Our work adds to the current body of work on webpage
fingerprinting by demonstrating a new and complementary
side-channel.
C. USB Data Port Vulnerabilities
Nohl et al. [20] and Davis [21] demonstrated that it is
possible to install malicious software on smartphones via their
USB port by exploiting vulnerabilities in mobile operating
systems. To prevent these attacks, the authors suggest to
disable/remove data pins in the USB cable. Unfortunately, our
work shows that even if data pins are removed, the charging
station can still learn information about the user’s browsing
activity.
III. EXPERIMENT SETUP
We collected power traces while webpages were loading
on two types of smartphones: Samsung Galaxy S4, and
Samsung Galaxy S6. We used the homepages of the 50 most
popular (non-adult) websites, based on Alexa ranking [11] (see
Table IX in Appendix). These websites represent over 30% of
the page views on the Internet [10]. To collect power traces
during webpage loading, we instrumented the USB charging
circuit as shown in Figure 1. Our circuit connects a DC power
supply, a smartphone, and a data acquisition card (DAQ), and
measures voltage variations (and therefore the corresponding
power consumed) across a 0.1  shunt resistor. To satisfy the
USB charging specifications [22], we connected the data pins
of the USB cable using a 200  resistor.
Most smartphones use lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries due
to their high energy density. The charging profile of Li-ion
batteries encompasses two stages [23]. In the first stage, the
smartphone charging circuit applies constant current to the
battery. This stage ends when the battery reaches a specific
Fig. 1. Overview of the setup used to collect power traces.
Fig. 2. Power traces collected during the first 6 seconds of automated
webpage loading activity. The left and right panels show power traces
collected while loading google.com, and youtube.com, respectively.
The x axis shows time (in seconds) from the beginning of the webpage loading
activity, and the y axis shows the power consumed by the smartphone.
charging voltage (usually between 3.7 V and 4.2 V). In the
second stage, the battery is charged at a constant voltage, and
the current gradually decreases until it reaches a termination
value. Because the battery charging process could take several
hours, the current used to charge the battery does not vary
significantly while the smartphone is loading a webpage.
We used an Agilent E3630A DC power supply [24] as the
power source. We measured the voltage drop across the shunt
resistor using a National Instrument USB-6211 (DAQ) [25]
at a sampling rate of 200 kHz. We set the power supply to
output a fixed voltage of 5.5 V. This voltage is higher than the
nominal USB voltage of 5 V to compensate for the voltage
drop introduced by the shunt resistor. The resulting voltage
was between 5.32 V and 5.48 V, which is within the tolerance
of many modern smartphones [22]. The DAQ’s data output was
connected to a laptop, which stored data for offline analysis
using LabVIEW. Figure 2 shows the power consumption traces
collected while loading the homepages of google.com and
youtube.com.
We collected power traces in two modes: user-actuated,
and automated. With user-actuated traces, the user initiates
webpage loading by typing a URL in Mobile Chrome’s
address bar. To collect automated traces, we developed an
Android application that launches the Chrome browser, and
uses it to load the intended webpage. Our application allows
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10 seconds for webpage loading (only the first 6 seconds of
data were recorded), and then loads the next webpage. Before
each measurement, we closed all other applications on the
smartphone, and set the screen brightness to a constant level.
User-actuated and automated traces were collected under
two conditions: battery level (30% vs. 100%),1 and browser
cache (enabled vs. disabled). We chose these conditions
because they impact smartphone energy consumption. When
the battery is fully charged, almost all power from the charger
is used to load webpages. In contrast, when the smartphone
is charging, a sizable (almost constant) amount of power is
used to charge the battery, hence affecting the traces. Cache
availability was chosen because cache misses increase network
activity, and therefore radio activity. Retrieving data wirelessly
requires more energy than loading it from local flash memory.
We collected 40 automated traces per webpage for each of
the following combinations: 30% battery, cache; 30% battery,
no cache; 100% battery, cache; 100% battery, no cache.
Additionally, we collected 10 user-actuated traces for the same
combinations. To collect traces, we used four Samsung Galaxy
S4 devices (in the rest of the paper, we refer to these devices
as D1, D2, D3, and D4) in most of the experiments. To analyze
the impact of different smartphone models on the attack, we
also conducted experiments on a Samsung Galaxy S6 (referred
to as D5). We collected all traces in Old Westbury (NY), and
in Williamsburg (VA). Further details on our datasets and their
usage in our paper are provided in Table X in Appendix.
IV. WEBPAGE IDENTIFICATION
Our webpage identification process consists of training
and testing phases. In the training phase: (1) we extracted
frequency-domain features from the power traces; and (2) we
trained a classifier (Random Forest [26]) on the extracted
feature vectors. During the testing phase, we use the trained
classifier to predict webpage labels on new data. To improve
identification accuracy, we performed feature extraction on
partially overlapping segments from traces, and implemented
classifier voting. Next, we provide details on feature extraction,
classification, and trace segmentation.
d) Classifier Training and Testing: We used Random
Forest [26] to classify power traces because in our experiments
it outperformed other commonly used classifiers, such as
SVM [27], [28], and Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [29].
We used the WEKA [30] implementation of Random Forest.
We experimented with four training-testing scenarios. The
first involved 40 power traces per webpage, collected using
automated webpage loading; 20 traces were used for train-
ing the classifier, and the remaining 20 traces for testing.
This scenario is used when training and testing are per-
formed with data from the same smartphone, such as in
tables I, III, VI, VII, VIII.
In the second scenario, we trained the classifier using all
40 automatically-collected traces, and performed testing with
1We implemented the 30% battery level condition as follows. We charged
the smartphone battery to 30% level, and then started collecting power traces
while still charging the smartphone. As the battery reached 35% level, we
interrupted data collection, discharged it to 30%, and resumed the collection
of power traces.
Fig. 3. Aggregate amplitudes corresponding to the first 60 bins computed
from the power traces of google.com and youtube.com. (Corresponding
time-domain traces are illustrated in Figure 2.) The x axis represents the index
of each bin.
10 traces collected via user-actuated page loading. This
scenario was used with data is collected with user taps,
i.e., in Table II.
In the third scenario, we trained our classifier using 40 traces
per webpage, collected using automated webpage loading, on
one smartphone device; we then used 40 traces collected from
a different smartphone device for testing. This scenario was
used in tables IV and V, and in Figure 6.
Finally, in the fourth scenario, we trained the classifier using
80 traces from two smartphones (40 traces from each device),
and tested on 40 traces from a different smartphone. This
scenario was used in tables IV and V, and in Figure 6.
e) Feature Extraction: We transformed each power trace
to its corresponding frequency-domain representation using
Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [31]. To reduce the impact of
noise on individual frequencies, we divided the frequency
range into equal-size bins. For each bin, we calculated the
average amplitude of all the frequencies in it. The average
amplitudes were used as features. We experimented with
different numbers of bins, and settled on using 125 bins
(resulting in 125 features) when using the same device for
training and testing, because this value led to the highest
identification accuracy. When using different devices and
smartphone models during training and testing, we used the
first 15 of 125 bins (i.e., first 15 features) corresponding to
the 15 lowest frequencies, which allowed us to achieve the
highest identification accuracy for this setting. Figure 3 shows
the result of feature extraction on the data in Figure 2. Each
data point in Figure 3 represents a feature.
f) Trace Segmentation and Voting: Variable network con-
ditions, web-server load, and smartphone background applica-
tions introduce intermittent noise in power traces. To mitigate
the effects of noise, we divided each trace into overlapping
0.5-second segments. Feature extraction was performed on
each segment, and the classifier was trained using segments
from all traces. For testing, we classified individual segments
of a session, and used the classification results as votes.
Each trace was then assigned to the class that received the
largest number of votes. This strategy of segmenting and using
majority voting led to an improvement in accuracy between
0.1% and 7.7% compared to using entire traces.
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g) Evaluation of Identification Performance: To evaluate
classifier performance, we calculated Rank 1 and Rank 5
identification accuracies. With Rank 1, a trace is classified
correctly if the most popular label assigned to the trace’s
segments is the correct label for the trace. In case of ties,
the classifier outputs the label with the highest associated
confidence, defined as Random forest leaf node probability.
With Rank 5, we consider a trace as correctly classified if the
correct label appears within the 5 most popular labels.
Because our identification task involves predicting 50 web-
pages, the baseline accuracies, obtained by randomly guessing
the webpages, are 2% for Rank 1 and 10% for Rank 5.
Finally, for each rank, we also present the Normalized
Rank-n Accuracy, which is defined as follows. Let pn be
the probability that the classifier correctly labels a trace for
Rank-n. The probability of correctly guessing the website
loaded by the smartphone is computed as pn/n, and represents
the probability that the adversary guesses the correct website
label given the Rank-n output of the classifier.
We consider this metric because it represents the uncertainty
an adversary encounters in identifying the website correctly as
the rank increases. For example, if Rank 2 accuracy is 60%,
and Rank 5 accuracy is 95%, then the normalized Rank 2
accuracy is 30%, while the normalized Rank 5 accuracy
is 19%. This shows that if the adversary is interested in
identifying a unique website visited by the user, Rank 2
leads to better results. On the other hand, if the adversary
only needs to know if the user is visiting any of the five
webpages identified in Rank 5 (e.g., because they are all
from social networking websites), then the Rank 5 result is
more meaningful. Therefore, the information provided by this
metric complements the Rank 1 and Rank 5 accuracy results
presented throughout the paper.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluated identification accuracy under three variables:
(1) trace length (2 s, 4 s, and 6 s), (2) cache enabled vs. dis-
abled, and (3) battery charge level (30% vs. 100%). In this
section, we report how these variables impact identification
accuracy for automated and user-actuated data collection.
Identification accuracies under other variables, such as differ-
ent smartphones used in training and testing, type of wireless
connectivity, time elapsed between collection of training and
testing traces, location of the hosts serving the webpages, and
HTTP vs. HTTPS, are reported in sections VI-C and VI-D.
A. Identification Accuracy on Automated Dataset
Our results for the automated dataset are reported in Table I.
We achieved identification accuracy of at least 82.8% for
Rank 1, and at least 92.8% for Rank 5 using a Samsung
Galaxy S4, with 2 second traces. With a Samsung Galaxy
S6, accuracies were at least 75.2% for Rank 1, and at least
91.8% for Rank 5. Next, we discuss how each variable affects
identification accuracy.
h) Trace Duration: Increasing the duration of the traces
led to an improvement of identification accuracy. Although we
achieved the highest identification accuracy with six-second
TABLE I
IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY (IN %) USING FREQUENCY-DOMAIN
FEATURES AND CLASSIFIER VOTING FOR AUTOMATED DATASET
COLLECTED USING D1. FOR COMPARISON, RESULTS
FROM A SAMSUNG GALAXY S6 (D5) ARE ALSO
REPORTED. ALL EXPERIMENTS WERE
PERFORMED USING 125 FEATURES
traces, we also had good identification accuracies (Rank 1:
82.8%-98.8%) with 2-second traces, as shown in Table I.
Given that most webpages load within a few seconds on
smartphones (2.9 s to 5 s on average, according to [32]), our
results indicate that the attack correctly identifies a webpage
within the typical loading time.
i) Caching: Our results show that enabling cache
improved identification accuracy (see Table I). This is fur-
ther validated by our results, reported in Table VII, where
enabling cache improved identification accuracy for foreign-
hosted websites more than for websites located within the
United States. This is because the farther the host serving the
content, the more network-related noise is added to the traces
(see Section VI-D for further details).
j) Battery Level: Users connect their smartphones to
charging ports at various battery levels [1]. Our experiments
show that this variability impacts identification accuracy.
In particular, we were consistently able to classify traces
with higher accuracy when the battery was fully charged
(see Table I).
This can be explained by comparing the power traces
illustrated in Figure 4. The USB charging specifications set
an upper bound of 1.8 A to the amount of current that the
smartphone can draw from the USB port. If the phone is
charging, a substantial amount of the available current is
directed to the battery, and therefore the fluctuations in power
consumption due to webpage loading is limited. This is evident
in Figure 4, where the signal corresponding to 30% battery has
considerably lower variability compared to the signal collected
with fully charged battery.
B. Identification Accuracy on User-Actuated Dataset
Once we included user activity in the form of taps,
identification accuracy dropped significantly due to tap-
induced noise. This is because tap characteristics (e.g., tap
location on the screen, timing, and duration) are different
in each trace, which leads to noisy traces. To validate
this observation, we computed the average (intra-class)
Dynamic Time Warp (DTW) distance between pairs of
user-actuated traces, and between pairs of automated
traces, under different caching and charging conditions.
The average distance between user-actuated traces was
consistently higher than the distance between automated
traces. With cache enabled and fully charged battery, the
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Fig. 4. Power traces obtained while loading the same webpage
(yahoo.com) with 30% and 100% battery level. The figure shows that the
trace corresponding to 100% battery level exhibits a relatively higher dynamic
range, because it is not capped by the 1.8 A limit which is often reached by
the trace corresponding to 30% battery level.
Fig. 5. Average inter-class DTW distance on automated traces for each
webpage. Measurements are performed with battery fully charged, and with
cache enabled. Data is sorted in ascending order of average DTW distance.
average DTW distance between user-actuated traces was
17%-38% higher than the average distance between
automatically-collected traces. When the smartphone was
charging from 30% level, and with cache enabled, the DTW
distance increased by 34%-86% when including taps. Once
cache was disabled, the average DTW distance increased
by 5%-15% with taps and with the battery fully charged.
With no cache and battery charging from 30% level, the
average DTW distance between automated and user-actuated
traces increased by 31%-56%. Figure 5 shows the relative
distance for each webpage with fully charged battery and
cache enabled.
While two seconds were sufficient to classify webpages
with high confidence using automated traces, this was not the
case with traces from the user-actuated dataset. Regardless
of caching and charging, we achieved good Rank 1 accuracy
with six-second traces. In this setting, we correctly identified
webpages between 54.2% and 88.4% of the times (for refer-
ence, selecting a webpage at random out of 50 leads to 2%
accuracy). We achieved good Rank 5 accuracy (53.6% to 95%,
compared to 10% with random chance) with four- and
six-second traces. Charging had still a measurable impact on
TABLE II
IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY (IN %) USING FREQUENCY DOMAIN
FEATURES AND CLASSIFIER VOTING FOR USER-ACTUATED
TRACES (I.E., WITH TAPS) COLLECTED USING D1.
ALL RESULTS WERE OBTAINED
USING 125 FEATURES
TABLE III
IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY (IN %) USING FREQUENCY-DOMAIN
FEATURES AND CLASSIFIER VOTING FOR AUTOMATED DATASET
COLLECTED USING D2. ALL EXPERIMENTS WERE
PERFORMED WITH A FULLY-CHARGED BATTERY,
AND NO CACHE, USING 125 FEATURES
identification accuracy: identification on a fully charged phone
consistently led to better results, all other variables being
the same. Enabling cache with fully charged battery led to a
2.2%-5.8% improvement in identification accuracy. However,
when we enabled cache in traces collected at 30% battery
level, webpage identification accuracy dropped significantly.
We hypothesize that this happened because taps on screen
and battery charging contribute to a substantial increase in
noise in power traces. Under these conditions, networking
becomes an important source of discriminability between
website traces. Enabling cache reduces the contribution of
the network component to the power traces, in turn reducing
classification accuracy.
Overall, our experiments show that although the presence
of taps substantially reduces identification accuracy compared
to automated collection of power traces, it is still possible to
accurately classify six-second user-actuated traces.
VI. IMPACT OF OTHER VARIABLES
We examined the identification accuracies according to
the following variables: (1) different smartphones used for
training and testing (training traces were collected from one
or more smartphones that are not used for testing); (2) LTE
and WiFi training and testing; (3) aging of training traces;
(4) domestic vs. foreign websites, and (5) websites accessible
via unencrypted connections (denoted as “HTTP”) vs. acces-
sible through TLS-encrypted links (denoted as “HTTPS”).
Table IX in Appendix indicates which websites are local,
and/or accessible over HTTPS. Next, we provide details on
our findings with respect to each variable. For all experiments
in this section, we used only automated traces.
A. Training and Testing Traces From Different Devices
Tables IV and V summarize our result when using different
smartphones for training and testing. Using one smartphone
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TABLE IV
IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY (IN %) USING FREQUENCY-DOMAIN
FEATURES AND CLASSIFIER VOTING FOR AUTOMATED DATASET.
ALL EXPERIMENTS WERE PERFORMED WITH A
FULLY-CHARGED BATTERY, AND NO CACHE,
USING 15 FEATURES
TABLE V
IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY (IN %) USING FREQUENCY-DOMAIN
FEATURES AND CLASSIFIER VOTING FOR AUTOMATED DATASET.
ALL EXPERIMENTS WERE PERFORMED WITH THE
BATTERY CHARGING FROM 30%, AND NO
CACHE, USING 15 FEATURES
for training, and a different smartphone for testing led to
a significant drop in identification accuracy. On the other
hand, by training on two devices, and testing on a third, we
were able to achieve identification accuracies above 80% with
6-second traces. This is likely because the classifier generalizes
better when trained on multiple devices, which account for
more variety within the traces.
B. Training and Testing Using WiFi and LTE
We collected power traces while accessing websites over
both WiFi and LTE and experimented with three training-
testing configurations: (1) LTE training and LTE testing,
(2) LTE training and WiFi testing, and (3) WiFi training and
LTE testing. Our results (see Table III) show that accuracy
obtained when training and testing on LTE is comparable to
that of training and testing on WiFi (in Table I). Further,
though there was reduction in accuracies with WiFi training-
LTE testing and LTE training-WiFi testing, the overall results
were significantly higher than the baseline (2%) at Rank 1,
and at least 73.9% for 6 second traces.
C. Aging of Training Traces
Many of the webpages considered in this work contain
content that changes over time. For example, the home page
of yahoo.com shows recent news, and is therefore updated
several times a day. For these webpages, a training dataset
collected at a specific point in time might not be repre-
sentative of the webpage’s behavior at a later point, when
the testing traces are collected. To determine the impact of
aging on training data, we collected testing traces 32 and
70 days after training, with cache enabled and fully charged
battery. The corresponding results are summarized in Table VI.
TABLE VI
IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY (IN %) USING 70-DAY-OLD AND
32-DAY-OLD TRAINING DATASETS COLLECTED USING D1.
ALL RESULTS WERE OBTAINED USING 125 FEATURES
TABLE VII
RANK 1 WEBPAGE IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY (IN %) FOR DOMESTIC
(INDICATED AS “Dom.”) AND FOREIGN (“For.”) WEBSITES. TRACES
WERE COLLECTED USING D1. ALL RESULTS WERE OBTAINED
USING 125 FEATURES
For reference, all traces used to obtain the results reported in
tables I and II were collected within a 48-hour timeframe.
When we trained the classifier on traces collected 32 days
before testing, Rank 1 identification accuracy dropped
below 13%. Even worse, the identification accuracy with
training traces collected 70 days before testing was consis-
tently below 4%. This suggests that, in order to achieve
good identification accuracy, training traces should be updated
frequently.
D. Foreign vs. Domestic Websites
We tested this variable because the distance between the
client and the host serving a webpage is known to affect
packets’ delay and jitter [33]. More specifically, the farther
the host serving the content, the more variable will be its
measured bandwidth and delay. In turn, this variability affects
page loading, and hence the corresponding power traces.
We determined whether a webpage was served from a host
(e.g., a server, or a CDN) within the continental United States
or outside the United States using the Whois databases from
ARIN [34] and APNIC [35]. Our dataset is composed of
36 domestic websites, and 14 foreign websites.
The results of our analysis are summarized in Table VII.
Our experiments show that the location of the host serving a
webpage has a very small impact on identification accuracy.
Enabling cache led to a larger improvement in webpage
identification accuracy for foreign websites than for domestic
websites.
E. HTTPS vs. HTTP Websites
We tested this variable because the use of encryption
between the smartphone and the server can introduce noise
in power traces. In particular, TLS requires additional com-
munication rounds to exchange TLS session keys before a
connection can be established. This can potentially increase
the variability of power traces.
A total of 15 webpages in our dataset allow users to retrieve
content using HTTPS, while the remaining 35 webpages
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TABLE VIII
RANK 1 WEBPAGE IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY (IN %) FOR WEBPAGES
RETRIEVED VIA HTTPS AND PLAIN HTTP. TRACES WERE
COLLECTED USING D1. ALL RESULTS WERE OBTAINED
USING 125 FEATURES
only allow plain HTTP connections. Our results, reported in
Table VIII, show that there is no significant difference in
identification accuracy between the two types of websites. This
indicates that the attack is as effective for identifying securely
transmitted webpages as with webpages transmitted without
encryption.
VII. NORMALIZED RANK-n ACCURACY
Figure 6 shows the Rank vs. Normalized Rank-n Accuracy
plots for our classifier, obtained using frequency-domain fea-
tures. All traces used in this evaluation were obtained with no
cache, and with fully-charged battery.
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) show results of experiments where
training and testing traces were from different devices, and
different connectivity, respectively. The two figures show that
increasing the rank leads to a decrease in normalized Rank-n
accuracy. This means that the adversary has lower probability
of correctly guessing a webpage as the rank increases. This is
because Rank 1 accuracy is already substantially higher than
the baseline. Therefore, increasing the rank provides almost
no benefits towards correctly guessing the webpage. Although
the normalized Rank-n accuracy approaches the baseline as
the rank increases, figures 6(a) and 6(b) show that, even at
Rank 12, our technique still outperforms the baseline.
The traces used in Figure 6(c) were collected on a single
smartphone, with training and testing data collected 70 days
apart. This figure shows that when outdated traces are used
for training, Rank 1 classification no longer provides the
highest normalized Rank-n accuracy. This is because of two
reasons: (1) Rank 1 accuracy in this setting is close to the
baseline; and (2) as the rank increases, the classifier outputs
a better uncertainty set compared to random choice. As a
result, the Rank 2 to Rank 4 accuracies increase more than
the uncertainty due to the increased rank. For instance, when
going from Rank 1 to Rank 4, the output of the classifier
includes three additional webpages that are far more likely to
be correct than three pages chosen at random. Therefore, in
this particular case, the adversary is more likely to correctly
guess the webpage by first increasing the rank from 1 to 4.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we demonstrated that it is possible to accu-
rately infer browsing activity on a smartphone using USB
power consumption measurements. Our work is the first to
study this side-channel attack on smartphones, and to analyze a
multitude of factors that affect the traces that are collected dur-
ing the attack, such as: battery charging level, user interaction
Fig. 6. Rank vs. Normalized Rank-n Accuracy plots show the results of
our experiments with automated dataset, using frequency-domain features and
classifier voting. All experiments were performed with a fully-charged battery
and no cache. The plots in the top figure were obtained using 15 features, and
the plots in the middle and bottom figures were obtained using 125 features,
because these settings led to the best results. (a) Training on one or more
devices, and testing on a different one. (b) Training and testing performed
using WiFi and LTE. (c) Training and testing with traces collected 70 days
apart.
with the touchscreen, trace length, time between collection of
training and testing traces, WiFi and LTE connectivity, training
and testing device mismatch, and website characteristics such
as type of connection (HTTP or HTTPS) and location of the
host serving the webpage relative to the smartphone.
We performed extensive experiments to validate our
approach. Our results show that the attack successfully iden-
tifies webpages loaded using the standard Android mobile
browser at least 91.7% of the times within four seconds for the
automated dataset. For our user-actuated dataset, identification
accuracy was between 54.2% and 88.4% with six seconds
of power consumption data. Factors such as the availability
of cache, the use of secure connections (HTTPS) and the
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TABLE IX
ALEXA TOP 50 NON-ADULT WEBSITES, AS OF JUNE 2015. THE TABLE REPORTS WHETHER EACH WEBSITE
IS FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC, AND WEATHER AND THE CONNECTION TYPE IS HTTP OR HTTPS
TABLE X
DETAILS ON THE DATASET USED IN THIS PAPER. THE DEVICES USED FOR DATA COLLECTION ARE FOUR SAMSUNG
GALAXY S4 (LABELLED D1, D2, D3, AND D4 IN THE TABLE), AND ONE SAMSUNG GALAXY S6 (D5)
location of the websites had a small effect on identification
accuracies. Other factors, such as mismatch between training
and testing traces due to the use of different devices and the
type of wireless connectivity negatively impacted accuracies.
However, training on multiple devices allowed us to achieve
accuracies substantially higher than the baseline for Rank 1.
Overall, our results show that the attack is highly effective,
because webpage loading generates power signatures that are:
(1) distinctive: different webpages generate different power
traces due to factors such as the amount of data (text, images,
and videos) being retrieved, the number of TCP connections
required to retrieve all webpage components, and the com-
putational cost of the scripts running within the webpage;
and (2) consistent: each time a particular page is loaded, it
generates a power trace that is similar to its previous power
traces.
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Though our work focuses on webpage identification, we
believe that the same side-channel can also be used to detect
other user activities, such as which application is currently
being used, and the timing of touch events (including typing
information). We consider this work as the first step towards a
deeper understanding of the extent of the information leaked
through power analysis of the USB port of a smartphone.
Clearly, there are a multitude of factors that we did not address
in this paper, such as number of applications installed on
the smartphone, background processes, network congestion,
WiFi/LTE signal strength, and specific user interaction. We
leave the analysis of these factors to future work.
APPENDIX
Table IX reports which websites are domestic, and which
ones are accessible via HTTPS. We summarize all other
dataset characteristics in Table X.
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